Emily Normandeau v. International Truck and Engine Corporation : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Emily Normandeau v. International Truck and
Engine Corporation : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Colin P. King, Paul M. Simmons, Tawni J. Sherman; Dewsnup, King & Olsen; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Melinda A. Morgan, Zachary E. Peterson; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for
Defendants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Normandeau v. International Truck, No. 20060723 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6740
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
EMILY NORMANDEAU, individually 
and as guardian for ALEX THAYN, 
JACOB THAYN and HANNAH 
NORMANDEAU, minors, and LORI 
NORMANDEAU, as guardian for 
DANIEL NORMANDEAU and 
MELISSA NORMANDEAU, minors, on 
behalf of and for the benefit of the heirs of 
DENNIS NORMANDEAU, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND 
ENGINE CORPORATION, a 
corporation; BENDIX COMMERCIAL 
VEHICLE SYSTEMS, LLC, a limited 
liability company; GENERAL MOTORS 
CORPORATION, a corporation, by and 
through its ALLISON TRANSMISSION 
DIVISION; BUDGET RENT A CAR 
SYSTEM, INC., a corporation fka 
BUDGET/RYDER TRS; HANSON 
EQUIPMENT, INC., a corporation; 
SUMMIT HOUSE FINE FURNITURE, 
L.L.C., a limited liability company; 
DANA CORPORATION, a corporation, 
and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
Appeal No. 20060723-CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
On Remand from the Utah Supreme Court 
Colin P. King 
Paul M. Simmons 
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
36 South State Street, #2400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-0400 
Fax No.: (801) 363-4218 
Melinda A. Morgan [8392] 
Zachary E. Peterson [8502] 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Hanson 
Equipment, Inc. 
Wells Fargo Center 
299 South Main Street, 15th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-2000 FILED 
Fax No.: (801) 532-55qjrAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 3 0 2009 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
EMILY NORMANDEAU, individually 
and as guardian for ALEX THAYN, 
JACOB THAYN and HANNAH 
NORMANDEAU, minors, and LORI 
NORMANDEAU, as guardian for 
DANIEL NORMANDEAU and 
MELISSA NORMANDEAU, minors, on 
behalf of and for the benefit of the heirs of 
DENNIS NORMANDEAU, deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND 
ENGINE CORPORATION, a 
corporation; BENDIX COMMERCIAL 
VEHICLE SYSTEMS, LLC, a limited 
liability company; GENERAL MOTORS 
CORPORATION, a corporation, by and 
through its ALLISON TRANSMISSION 
DIVISION; BUDGET RENT A CAR 
SYSTEM, INC., a corporation fka 
BUDGET/RYDER TRS; HANSON 
EQUIPMENT, INC., a corporation; 
SUMMIT HOUSE FINE FURNITURE, 
L.L.C., a limited liability company; 
DANA CORPORATION, a corporation, 
and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
Appeal No. 20060723-CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
On Remand from the Utah Supreme Court 
Colin P. King 
Paul M. Simmons 
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
36 South State Street, #2400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-0400 
Fax No.: (801) 363-4218 
Melinda A. Morgan [8392] 
Zachary E. Peterson [8502] 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Hanson 
Equipment, Inc. 
Wells Fargo Center 
299 South Main Street, 15th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-2000 
Fax No.: (801)532-5506 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The front page caption contains the names of all parties involved in this dispute. 
Only plaintiffs and defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc., are parties to this appeal. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF PARTIES ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS iii-iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2-5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 5 
ARGUMENT 5-15 
I. UNDER TRADITIONAL NEGLIGENCE ANALYSIS, A VEHICLE 
REPAIR SHOP OWES NO DUTY OF CARE TO A TOW TRUCK 
DRIVER 5-12 
A. Where no disputed issues of fact exist, the trial court erred in 
imposing a duty where the parties' relationship is highly 
attenuated and no other circumstances exist to find a duty 
of care 5-9 
B. Case on point holding no duty of care owed by prior repair shops to 
subsequent mechanics 10-11 
C. Special relationship 11-12 
II. THE PROFESSIONAL-RESCUER DOCTRINE IS ANALOGOUS... 12-15 
A. California has applied the Professional Rescuer Doctrine to tow 
truck drivers 14-15 
iii 
CONCLUSION 16 
ADDENDUM 18 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES Page 
AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of 
America, 942P.2d 315, 321 (Utah 1997) 8 
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d413, 418 (Utah 1986) 9, 11 
Carol Lorane Bryant v. Glastetter, 32 Cal.App.4th 770, 782 (1995) 8 
DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1003-4 (UtahCt. App. 1992) 7 
Drysdalev. Rogers, 869 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1994) 11 
Dyer v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 85, 67-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) 15 
Ferreev. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) 6 
Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2007 UT 74 12, 13 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993) 1 
Holland v. Crumb, 32 Cal. Rptr.2d 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) 14, 15 
Lovelandv. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 766 (Utah 1987) 7 
Reimer v. City ofCrookston, 326 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2003) 10 
Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, (1994) 14 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equip. Inc., 2007 UT App 382, ffif 13-14, 174 P.3d 1 4 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equip. Inc., 2009 UT44, 5, 6 
Sanders v. Posi-Seal Int'l, 668 So. 2d 742, (La. Ct. App. 1996) 8 
Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20,1J9, 979 P.2d 317 6 
Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 1 
Yazdv. Woodside Hopes Corp., 2006 UT47 7 
v 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 1 
vi 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0). 
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW & PRESERVATION 
Issue: Did the trial court err when it determined repair shop Hanson Equipment 
owes a duty of care to tow truck driver Normandeau? 
Standard of Review: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the appellate 
court reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is 
entitled to summary judgment presents a question of law and the appellate court grants no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See 
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct App. 
1997). 
Preservation: Hanson Equipment preserved this issue by filing a motion for 
summary judgment located in the record at 612-748. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
None. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The trial court erred when it denied Hanson Equipment's motion for summary 
judgment, incorrectly holding a repair shop owes a duty of care to a tow truck driver. 
Plaintiffs should not have been allowed to present their case to the jury, which awarded a 
substantial verdict on a case that should have been resolved at summary judgment. One 
who improperly repairs a truck does not owe a duty to another who subsequently tows the 
truck when it becomes disabled. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This lawsuit arises from the death of tow-truck driver Dennis Normandeau, who 
died on November 10, 2001, while preparing to tow a Ryder moving truck that had 
broken down at the side of the road. (R. at 619.) 
Hanson Equipment, in Glenwood Springs, Colorado, is in the business of servicing 
and repairing trucks, including the model involved in this case. (R. at 621.) On 
November 8, 2001, Hanson Equipment serviced a hose in this Ryder truck's hydraulic 
line for the brakes and power steering. (R. at 621.) The next day, Kristen Marion rented 
the truck and planned to drive it to Washington, where she was moving her family. (R. at 
622.) 
On November 10, 2001, en route to Washington, and while atop Soldier Summit 
in Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah, the truck's hydraulic line for the brakes and power 
steering failed, and Ms. Marion slowly pulled the truck off to the side of the road. (R. at 
622.) Ms. Marion contacted Ryder Roadside Assistance, who initially dispatched tow 
truck driver Larry Freeman to the scene. (R. at 622.) 
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When Mr. Freeman arrived, he realized his tow truck was too small to pull the 
Ryder truck. (R. at 622.) Nonetheless, Mr. Freeman thought he might be able to fix the 
truck, so he removed a hose that appeared to be dripping power steering fluid; he called 
various repair shops to find a replacement, but was unable to locate one. (R. at 622.) 
Since Mr. Freeman was unable to replace the hose, Kenworth was dispatched to bring a 
large diesel wrecker to tow the truck. Kenworth sent Normandeau. (R. at 623.) 
Normandeau was Kenworth Sales Company's primary wrecker driver. (R. at 
620.) Normandeau's supervisor at Kenworth, Kyle Bundy, taught Normandeau how to 
test whether or not a vehicle has any torque built up in its drive line. (R. at 620.) Mr. 
Bundy taught Normandeau that if he detected the driveline was not loose, then he needed 
to jack a tire up or start the engine and relieve the brake pressure. (R. at 660 at 25:7-23.) 
On average, Normandeau towed vehicles with a brake system similar to the Ryder 
truck three to five times a month. (R. at 621, 666 at 50:21-51:18.) During his deposition, 
Mr. Bundy agreed that it's "Basic Mechanics 101" for wrecker drivers to try to wiggle 
the driveline and if it has tension, to put the truck in neutral and raise the rear tires before 
disassembling it. (R. at 621, 660 at 26:22-27:24.) Mr. Bundy testified that if a driveline 
doesn't wiggle, there is no way to quantify how much tension is built up in it, whether it 
be 100 pounds or 10,000 pounds of pressure. (R. at 621.) Normandeau's co-worker 
Landon Jacobson testified that before a tow he always checks the driveline to see if there 
is any built-up tension in it before he disassembles it. (R. at 624.) 
In order to tow the truck, Normandeau had to disconnect the driveline so as not to 
damage the truck's transmission. (R. at 846.) Unfortunately, torque had built up in the 
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driveline, and when Normandeau started to remove the third of four bolts connecting the 
driveline, it broke free, suddenly striking him in the head and killing him. (R. at 623.) 
Claim 
In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege only one theory of liability against 
defendant Hanson Equipment: the repair shop negligently repaired the truck, which 
caused it "to break down under circumstances that required it to be towed." (R. at 181-
194.) 
Procedural History 
Hanson Equipment filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing plaintiffs could 
not establish a duty of care was owed to Normandeau. (R. at 626-634.) (Hanson 
Equipment made other arguments regarding lack of proximate cause and contributory 
negligence; however, these arguments are now irrelevant to this appeal.) The trial court 
denied Hanson Equipment's motion for summary judgment without providing any basis 
for its denial. (R. at 1182-84.) This case was subsequently tried to a jury, which returned 
a verdict for the Normandeaus. 
Hanson Equipment appealed the trial court's denial of its pretrial motion for 
summary judgment on the duty issue. This Court held it could not review the ruling since 
Hanson Equipment did not reraise the issue at trial nor move for a directed verdict on it. 
See Normandeau v. Hanson Equip. Inc., 2007 UT App 382, ffll3-14, 174 P.3d 1. 
However, since "our case law has been less than clear in defining when appellate review 
of denials for summary judgment motions is precluded," the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. See Normandeau v. Hanson Equip. Inc., 2009 UT 44 at f 7. The Supreme 
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Court ivwrsnl tin/ d'vision ol (In ; < onrl ,iit<i held ;i denial of a pretrial summary 
judgment motion is reviewable where, like here; the basis for (lie motion IN purely legal. 
See id, at ^16-17. 
i his < Mill iir1 ilvd (he parties to provide self-contained briefs to supercede or • 
replace the briefs already of record,, rather than provide si lpplei nei ital briefs, to a;v oid 
dealing with two layers of briefing. (See Order of Judge Gregory K. Orme, dated 
Sepfenibei 1 I, Mil • . . •- . '•.-• • . . . ' •  • -. . 
SUMMARY OK ARGUMENT 
Repair shop Hanson Equipment does not owe a duty of care to tow truck driver 
Normiindeau. «uid (he trial court erred when it denied Hanson Equipment's motion for 
summary judgment on this issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Under Traditional Negligence Analysis, A Vehicle Repair Shop 
Owes No Doty of Care to a Tow Truck Driver. 
A. Where no disputed issues of fact exist, the trial court erred in imposing a duty 
where the parties5 relationship is highly attenuated and no other 
circumstances exist to find a duty of care. 
Based on (In: parties' attenuated relationship and the Utah Supreme Court's 
guidance, the trial court erred when it concluded a repaii • li. »p * n\ al ;i low \v\wk driver a 
duty of care when its repair rendered a vehicle inoperable. '"One essential element of a 
negligence action is a duty of reasonable care owed to the plaintiff by [the] defendant. 
Absent a showing of duty, [the plaintiff] cannot recover.'" Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 
1999 UT 20,1[9, 979 P.2d 317. A duty has been described as "a question of whether the 
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defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of a particular plaintiff." Ferree v. State 
of Utah, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (quotation omitted). "A court determines 
whether a duty exists by analyzing the legal relationship between the parties, the 
foreseeability of injury, the likelihood of injury, public policy as to which party can best 
bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and other general policy considerations." See 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equip. Inc., 2009 UT 44 at f 19 (citations omitted). 
In wrestling with whether a duty was owed in this case, the Utah Supreme Court 
provided some guidance to the analysis of when a duty is created. Importantly, the 
Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that duty was fact intensive, intertwined with 
foreseeability, and related to factual issues presented at trial. Instead, the Supreme Court 
stated: "Foreseeability as a factor in determining duty does not relate to the specifics of 
the alleged tortious conduct but rather to the general relationship between the alleged 
tortfeasor and the victim." Normandeau IL at f^ 20. "At times, factual issues may bear on 
the issue of foreseeability as it relates to duty, but [Normandeau] is not such a case....in 
this case, there is no specific relationship test to be applied to determine whether Hanson 
owed Mr. Normandeau a duty. Rather, the court had the undisputed facts necessary to 
examine the legal relationships between the parties and analyze the duties created by 
these relationships." Id, at f^ 21 (quotations and citations omitted). 
In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs generally allege a theory of negligence 
against defendant Hanson Equipment, but do not state what legal duty was owed to tow 
truck driver Normandeau, because no such duty exists. The only act which could form 
the basis of a duty was the repair of the truck's hydraulic hose. Thus, plaintiffs needed to 
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articulate a dul\ ul uiiv llml cvislni behuvti Hanson Equipment and Normandeau based 
on the parties' relationship. However, the parties' relationship is ten i .ittrniutal lor the 
repair shop to owe a duty of care to a tow truck driver. 
Given Hit plaintiffs' vague statement about the duty owed, the trial court was left 
with little .guidance as to what gave rise to the dui) -. -^is case, I Itah law „ how ever, 
provides the necessary guidance: "resolution of this [duty] issue begins with an 
examination m liu; fq»al relationships between, the parties, followed by an analysis of the 
duties created by these relationships.' Loveland v. Grem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 766 
(Utah 1987). A legal duty "is the product of policy judgments applied to relationships." 
DeBry v. Valley Mortgage Co,, 835 P.2d 1000, 1003-4 (Utah Ct App. 1992). To 
properly answer whether or not a duty is owed, "a t k i . i:*,• ih;i: uu-
structure and dynamics of the relationship between the parties gives rise to the duty.... A 
relationship that is highly attenuated is less likely to be accompanied by a duty than one, 
for example, in which parties are in privity of contract." Yazd v. Woodside Hopes Corp., 
2006 UT 47, ^15-16 (emphasis added). 
In addition to evaluating the parties' relationship, courts weigh other factors to 
determine if a duty of care is owed * ! !hcr or not the plaintiff was reasonably 
foreseeable. In Utah, although foreseeability is not determinative, it is one of the factors 
used (V determine the existence of a duty of care: "[WJhether the law imposes a duty 
does not depend upon foreseeability alone. The likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the 
burden of guarding against it and the consequences of placing that bin den upon 
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defendant, must also be taken into account." AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. 
ofAmerica, 942 P.2d 315, 321 (Utah 1997) (quotations omitted). 
At summary judgment, the important undisputed facts were: tow truck drivers 
know a truck's driveline has to be disconnected to avoid damaging the transmission; 
Normandeau was employed as his company's primary wrecker driver; as part of his job, 
Normandeau was taught to check for and relieve torque that naturally occurs in a 
driveline; Hanson Equipment repaired the hydraulic line in the subject truck; two days 
later while the truck was being driven, the hydraulic line failed, causing the truck to 
become disabled and require a tow to a mechanic's shop. Without providing a basis for 
its denial, the district court incorrectly denied Hanson Equipment's motion, effectively 
holding a repair shop has a sufficiently close relationship to owe a duty of care to a tow 
truck driver injured during the course of his job. 
In this case, however, there is no legal support to assign a duty of care to Hanson 
Equipment. No duty of care should be owed by a repair shop to a tow truck driver who is 
summoned to tow a vehicle disabled by its incorrect repair. To impose a duty here would 
be akin to holding a gas station liable when its attendant insufficiently fuels a vehicle, 
causing it to run out of gas and need a tow. The mere furnishing of the necessity of 
needing a repair person is not sufficient to impose a duty. See, e.g., Carol Lorane Bryant 
v. Glastetter, 32 Cal.App.4th 770, 782 (1995) (drunk driver owed no duty to tow truck 
driver who was called to tow car after driver was arrested); Sanders v. Posi-Seal Int'l 668 
So. 2d 742, (La, Ct. App. 1996) (despite company's repairs to valve, company did not 
owe duty to subsequent repairman who was injured while repairing valve). 
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Should Hanson )'<|iii|ini<'Mi have foreseen that a negligent repair of a hydraulic • 
hose would lead to the injury of a tow truck driver who did not lice*! (tic danucrs inherent 
in a truck's braking system? Furthermore, should Hanson Equipment have foreseen that 
it inn (i in lx di liver would fail to take a known precaution to check for and relieve torque 
in the truck's driveline? The answer to both question1, is m» As such, I ianson Equ.ipiTi.ent 
owed no duty of care to the tow truck driver called to tow the Ryder truck when one of its 
hydraulic 1 loses failed. 
Whether a duty is owed "requires a careful consideration of the consequences for. 
the parties and society at large." Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 
1986), To extend a duty of care to a tow truck driver due to negligent repairs made by a 
mechanic would essentially burden mechanics shop with na- ^ligation to compensate 
tow truck drivers for injuries suffered while doing their job. Repair shops are not insurers 
of tow truck drivers—to operate, towers are required to purchase hefty insurance policies 
for their hazardous jobs, and the oitiis of responsibility for following proper procedure is 
best placed on them. They are trained how to safely tow trucks in variety ol 
circumstances, and no tow is like any other—the vehicles, weather conditions, time of 
day, and locations are always differed ow truck operator like Normandeau is 
engaged in an occupation where he knows or should know how to tow a disabled vd ride. 
Why a vehicle breaks down is not of much concern to a tow truck operator-his only task 
is to toM if To (IIIKI ;i duly here would lay responsibility for the safety of tow truck 
drivers at the feet of all those who wreck, improperly minnhiiii. oi abandon Ihni \ dudes, 
and not necessarily through any fault of their own. 
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B. Case on Point Holding No Duty of Care Owed by Prior Repair Shops to 
Subsequent Mechanics 
In Reimer v. City of Crookston, 326 R3d 957 (8th Cir. 2003), plaintiff was a 
repairman who was injured while repairing a broken down boiler. Among others, he sued 
Johnson Controls, the company that had performed previous maintenance services to the 
boiler. The court dismissed Johnson Controls because it found no duty of care was owed 
to the subsequent repairman. Id, at 959. After explaining that the existence of a duty 
depended upon "(1) the relationship of the parties, and (2) the foreseeability of the risk 
involved," id at 965, the court stated, "The mere fact that on occasion Johnson Controls 
would do...work does not...create a duty on its part to anyone down the line who may be 
harmed by the boiler." Id. In other words, just because an initial repairperson performs 
maintenance or repairs on an item, he or she does not owe a duty of care to a subsequent 
repairperson who might be injured while repairing or servicing the item. See id-
Johnson Controls' repairman never worked on the part that broke and caused 
injury, but this is of no consequence. The Reimer court further explained that one repair 
shop does not automatically owe a duty to a subsequent repair person by virtue of 
providing prior repairs. Here, Hanson Equipment did not work on the driveline that 
caused the injury, it worked on a hose in the hydraulic line that apparently broke. 
Plaintiffs' only claim against Hanson Equipment should have been dismissed for 
the same reason. The mere fact that Hanson Equipment performed maintenance work on 
the truck does not create a duty on its part to Normandeau, a tow truck driver "down the 
line" who was harmed while doing his job. It was unforseeable to Hanson Equipment, a 
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repair shop, tluf a low toul dnver would In: injured while preparing to tow a vehicle that 
had pulled over due to its allegedly negligent repair. The injun to plaintiff here is n n i 
remote and unrelated to the repair. 
I, ', S ( H i \ i i i l I t i ' l i i l i n h i i N l i i i d i • • • 
Finally, plaintiffs have alleged no facts to create a spei iai relit I inn ship \\ Inch 
would warrant the imposition of a non-traditional duty of control or protection. In 
Drysdaie v. Rogers, 869 P.2d 1 (Utah App.1994) (court held parents of intoxicated adult 
driver owed no duty to mother of child injured in ;m .nitnmnhlc accident! thr I 
noted that Utah has generally applied the "special relation" analysis in Sections 314 
111 iioiiiiji V/!0 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 2-3. Section 315 sets out the 
tort principle that one generally does not owe ;i duiv lo control the conduct of third 
persons unless a special relation exists, either between the actor and the third person or 
between the actor and the plaintiff. 1 Id. at 3 (quotation and citations omitted.) 
"The essence of u spei i,11 lelalionship is dependence by one party upon the other 
or mutual dependence between the parties." Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 
415 (I Jtah 1986). "These relationships generally arise when one assumes responsibility 
for another's safety or deprives another of his or her in H iii.il opportunities for self-
protection." Id "Legal duties are often found to exist in the context of contractual, 
fiduciary, and filial relationships.55 Id. 
l The "special relations55 that give rise to a duty to aid or protect another are: a common 
carrier to its passengers (see Restatement (Second) of Torts §314A(1) (1965)); an 
innkeeper to its guests (see id. at §314A(2)); a possessor of land to the public in response 
to an invitation (see id. at §314A(3)); and, one who takes custody of another so as to 
deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection (see id. at §314A(4)). 
In the instant case, no relationship exists—much less a special relationship— 
between repair shop Hanson Equipment and wrecker driver Normandeau, nor is one 
alleged. No contractual, fiduciary, or filial relationship exists between a tow truck driver 
and a repair shop which does an improper repair. The tow truck driver is not dependent 
in any way upon the repair shop. Hanson Equipment did not assume responsibility for 
Normandeau nor did it deprive him of his normal opportunities for self-protection. This 
tow truck driver was unknown to this repair shop. Because no special relationship exists 
between Hanson Equipment and Normandeau, the company owes him no duty of care. 
II. The Professional-Rescuer Doctrine is Analagous 
Although Normandeau was not a public safety employee paid by taxpayers, his 
profession is analogous to that of a firefighter or police officer. Normandeau was a 
professional whose job it was to go to the scene of disabled or wrecked vehicles, hook 
them up for towing, and tow them off roadways for safety and for repair. Put generally, 
the professional rescuer rule "bars those engaged in rescue work as part of their 
employment from recovering damages for injuries sustained on the job as a result of the 
negligence of the person rescued.5' 57 A Am.Jur.2d Negligence, §782 (2004). 
In Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2007 UT 74, the Supreme Court affirmed this Court's 
adoption of the "professional-rescuer doctrine." Fordham, a highway patrolman, was 
called to the scene of a traffic accident negligently caused by Oldroyd; while Fordham 
was in the process of retrieving flares from the trunk of his vehicle, an oncoming driver 
lost control of her vehicle and struck him. Fordham sued Oldroyd, the earlier driver to 
whose accident Fordham had been summoned. Determining that Fordham's claims 
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against ()Mrn\d are haired, (lie Court adopted the professional-rescuer doctrine on the 
grounds of sound public policy. The Supreme (\n\v\ s toitimlalioii ol tin, rule IN based on 
sound public policy judgment: "a person does not owe a duty of care to a professional 
rescuer for injurx that was sustained by the very negligence that occasioned the rescuer's 
presence and that was within the scoj TI- !p- ? , « i escuer's diities..." 
Fordham and many cases that address the professional-rescuer rule involve a 
ic safety officer like a firefighter or police officer; however, its rationale is not 
limited to public employees, alilioiii'ti ii.s, holding t\ ' In adopting the professional rescuer 
nomenclature, the Supreme Court notes the rule "has a broader reach to bar negligence 
claims by those who take on a professional duty to recue others irrespective of whether 
they do so in a public «»" private capacity." 2f 4, %l, in The Fordham rationale 
serves us well in this case, which involves a private professional rescuer—a tow Inick 
operator. 
For ils appeal, Hanson Equipment assumes its mechanic's negligent repair caused 
the rental truck to break down. Because of this negligent repaii, Nontuiideaii was 
summoned to the scene to tow the truck to where it could be fixed. Normandeau's injury 
arose 01 h^e negligence that occasioned his presence. However, his injury was within 
the scope of those risks inherent in his job as a professional resetlei 
Normandeau's chosen profession is inherently dangerous. As his company's 
primary wrecker drivei, he was hired, trained, and compensated to handle hazardous 
2 "Because it is not necessary to do more to reach the result in this case, we limit 
application of the rule to professional rescuers who, like firefighters and police officers, 
are public employees." 2007 UT 74, f 14. 
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situations. Tow truck drivers encounter a different situation every time they tow a 
vehicle; they are summoned to the scenes of accidents to tow disabled or wrecked 
vehicles, to impound vehicles from streets and highways, to precarious places with 
stranded or distressed motorists. Other inherently dangerous professions include roofers, 
electricians, pilots, farmers, and construction workers, to name a few. 
In the case before this Court, it would offend public policy considerations to 
permit an act of negligence to expose the tortfeasor to liability for injuries sustained in 
the course of one's performance of necessary, inherently dangerous, duties. Tow truck 
operators are surrounded, just like highway patrolmen are, by hazardous working 
conditions—vehicles moving at high speed, inclement weather, poor road conditions, and 
working in the dark at nighttime. These are hazardous jobs wherein the pay reflects the 
hazards undertaken and expensive workers compensation benefits are provided. 
This Court agreed with this application of the rule and barred Fordham's claims 
since all Oldroyd did is cause the need for the services of a rescuer, whose job it is to 
provide assistance for disabled vehicles. In our case, all that can be said is that the bad 
repair by Hanson Equipment caused the need for a tow truck operator to tow it where it 
could be repaired. Hanson Equipment owed no duty to any tow truck driver. 
A. California has applied the Professional Rescuer Doctrine to Tow Truck 
Drivers, 
In Holland v. Crumb, 32 Cal. Rptr.2d 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994),3 the Court of 
Appeals for the Second District of California applied the professional rescuer doctrine to 
3
 In Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 34 Cal Rptr. 2d 360, (1994) the 
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tow truck driver brought a personal injury action against several 
defendants who were involved in a chain of automobile accidents, claiming llial the 
defendants were liable for the injuries he received when he was struck by a third-party 
vehicle v\ liiic performing his towing services/ The court first defined the doctrine as a 
rule that: 
addresses those instances where a plaintiffs occupation positions him in a 
situation which was brought about by the negligent acts of another and in 
which the plaintiff becomes injured. The rule prevents the injured plaintiff 
from recovering against the other party if the injury resulted from a risk of 
harm which is natural to the plaintiffs occupation. 
Id. at 368. Like plaintiffs in the present action, the plaintiffs in Crumb argued that the 
fireman's rule could not be applied to tow truck drivers because they were not peace 
officers or firefighters. Id. at 36y. 1 fowever, the court disagreed with the plaintiffs 
contention and dismissed it as meritless. Id. In response, the court stated that "[t]he 
application of the firefighter's rule depends on the inherent dangers associated with one's 
employment, not with , . extraneous matters," Id. at 369-70. 
Supreme Court of California, in a footnote, "rejected] the reasoning of the court in 
Holland v. Crumb" regarding application of the firefighter's rule to the claim of a 
privately employed tow truck driver. Although this decision seemed to have cast 
doubt as to Holland's validity, the court in Dyer v. Superior Court clarified the 
Neighbarger holding with regard to the Holland case and stated that the footnote 
"viewed in context, does not overrule the holding in Holland" and that "the 
Neighbarger footnote leaves the holding in Holland intact." 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 85, 
67-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erroneously denied Hanson Equipment's motion for summary 
judgment, effectively holding that a repair shop owes a duty of care to a truck driver. 
Repair shops and tow truck drivers have no special relationship which would impose a 
duty of care on the former. Repair shops have no contractual, fiduciary, or filial 
relationships with a tow truck drivers called to tow a vehicle disabled due to their 
improper repair. The relationship between repair shops and the wrecker drivers is too 
attenuated to impose a duty. Tow truck drivers are like professional rescuers who have 
chosen a dangerous profession. They are often summoned to unsafe places and face 
hazardous conditions due to the negligence of another. One does not owe a duty of care 
to a professional rescuer who is injured conducting the duties inherent in his job. Hanson 
Equipment requests this Court reverse the trial court's decision and hold repair shops owe 
no duty of care to tow truck drivers. 
DATED this 26th day of October, 2009. 
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NO ADDENDUM IS REQUIRED. 
This appeal does not turn on the interpretation of any constitutional provisions, 
rules or statutes. None of the cited rules are of "central importance" to the appeal. To the 
extent a rule of civil procedure is cited, the relevant portion of the rule is set forth in the 
argument section of the brief. Although this is an appeal from an interim order from the 
trial court, that order does not provide any basis, details or analysis of the trial court's 
decision that would aid this Court in its review of it. 
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